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Introduction
A seller of a real estate generally has three alternative ways of marketing his property. He
can search for the buyer on his own efforts (FSBO – For Sale By Owners), list the house
with an MLS (Multiple Listing Service) broker, or list it with a non-MLS broker. The
choice of the marketing system may have broad implications for the seller. It may affect
the time on the market, the seller’s marketing costs, characteristics of the buyers contacted
through that maketing system, buyers’ search efforts, and the selling price. The focus of
this paper will be on the relationship between the marketing system choice and the selling
price.
A number of recent studies have examined whether a seller raises the price of his house
to pass on a portion, if not all, of the broker’s commission to the buyer when he chooses
to sell his house through a real estate broker. These studies provided seemingly conﬂicting
empirical answers to this question. Doiron et al. (1985), and Frew and Judd (1987) found
that one-third to one-half of the broker’s commission fee is passed on to the buyer
through the higher price paid for housing, while Tirtirog ˆlu (1996) reports that the
increase in price can even be greater than the commission amount. On the other hand,
Jud (1983) reports that houses sold through brokers do not sell for signiﬁcantly more than
houses sold by owners. The results of Kamath and Yantek (1982) and Zumpano, Elder
and Baryla (1995) suggest that if the brokerage commissions inﬂuence the prices at all,
they lead to lower prices.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. One is to provide a
theoretical model to explain these seemingly contradictory empirical results. We extend
the search model of Yavas ¸ (1992) to show that the price of a house sold by FSBO can be
lower, the same, or higher than the price of a similar house sold through a broker. Hence,
each of the above-mentioned seemingly conﬂicting empirical ﬁndings can be explained by
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Abstract. The objective of this paper is twofold. One is to provide a search-theoretical
model of the marketing choice of the seller. The model explains the seemingly contradictory
empirical results as to whether a seller raises the price of his house to pass on a portion of
the broker’s commission to the buyer. The second is to offer empirical evidence on the
impact of the MLS on the price. We control for selectivity bias in the data and obtain a
surprising result that the decision to use a multiple listing service decreases the sale price of
a property.differences in characteristics of the markets from which they have been derived. Similarly,
we argue that the price of a house sold through an MLS broker can be lower, the same,
or higher than the price of a similar house sold through a non-MLS broker.
The second contribution of the paper is empirical. While the existing studies look at
the price differences between houses sold through brokers and houses sold by owners, the
current study focuses on the price differences between houses sold through MLS services
and houses sold through non-MLS brokers and FSBOs. To our knowledge, this is the
ﬁrst attempt to examine the impact of the MLS on the prices. Unlike earlier studies, we
also test for potential selectivity bias problems in the data by employing the two-stage
estimation procedure described in Lee (1978) and Lee and Trost (1978). The ﬁrst stage
utilizes a probit equation with MLS choice as the limited dependent variable and
calculates the selectivity bias variables. The second stage uses a least squares procedure to
check for selectivity bias in the data and to test for price differential between the houses
sold through MLS and non-MLS. The results indicate that sample selection bias did not
exist in our sample. Finally, we ﬁnd that the expected price difference has a signiﬁcant
impact on the choice of marketing strategy and, as expected, a higher price differential
raises the likelihood of MLS choice. When calculating the effect of the MLS decision on
the price differential, we conclude that the decision to use a multiple listing service
decreases the sale price of a property.
The paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model is presented in the second
section. The econometric methodology is explained, and the empirical results are
reported in section three. Section four provides some concluding remarks.
The Theoretical Model
The purpose of this part of the paper is to provide a theoretical explanation for the
conﬂicting results in the literature (Kamath and Yantek, 1982; Jud, 1983; Doiron et al.,
1985; Frew and Jud, 1987; Tirtirog ˆlu, 1994) concerning the impact of brokerage on
housing prices. The search model used here is an extension of the search model used in
Yavas ¸ (1992). We will argue later that the analysis can also be used to study the impact of
the MLS on housing prices.
Consider a one-period bilateral search model where a risk-neutral seller and a risk-
neutral buyer search for each other to trade. The seller has a house for sale, and the buyer
wants to buy a house. The characteristics that the buyer desires in a house (location, size,
etc.) coincide with the characteristics of the seller’s house. The seller values the house at
Ps and the buyer at Pb. The valuations of the parties are private information. Each party
knows his own valuation but not the valuation of the other party. From the viewpoint of
the seller (buyer), the valuation of the buyer (seller) is uniformly distributed on the
interval [0,1].
Search and Trading without a Broker
We ﬁrst examine the search behavior of the two traders and the pricing strategy of the
seller in the absence of a broker. Alternatively, this can be interpreted as the study of the
search and trading strategies of the traders when the seller chooses not to list the house
with a broker. At the beginning of the period, each trader chooses a search intensity to
maximize his expected return from search.1 If the traders meet each other, the buyer
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buyer will purchase the house if his valuation of the house is greater than or equal to the
seller’s price. Otherwise, he will not purchase the house. In the bargaining literature, this
bargaining game is known as the ultimatum game where the seller makes an offer and the
buyer can either accept or reject the offer.2
A trader’s choice of the search intensity affects the probability and the cost of meeting
the other agent. Let Se[0,1] be the search intensity of the seller and Be[0,1] be the search
intensity of the buyer. The probability that the two agents meet is given by the matching
technology 0[u(S,B)5l(S1B) [1, 0[l[1⁄3.3 The cost of search is given by gsC(S) for
the seller, and by gbC(B) for the buyer, where gs$0, gb$0, and C is strictly increasing and
convex (C'$0, C"$0) with C'(0)50. The functions u(S,B), Cs(S), and Cb(B) are common
knowledge. Note that an increase in l increases the probability of a match for any given
S and B, hence makes search more efﬁcient for the traders, while an increase in gs(gb)
makes search more costly for the seller (buyer). Thus, the parameters l and g represent
efﬁciency and cost of search, respectively.
The traders play a simultaneous Cournot-Nash game where the seller chooses S and
P, and the buyer chooses B independently. Following the Cournot-Nash assumptions,
each trader, in choosing his search intensity, treats the search intensity of the other trader
as given. Given his conjecture about the search intensity of the buyer, B°, the problem of
the seller is to choose a search intensity and a price to maximize his expected return;
BASE (1)
where “˜” denotes a random variable.
The lower bound of the integral represents the fact that the buyer will be willing to
purchase the house only if his valuation Pb, is greater than or equal to the seller’s ask
price, P. When a sale occurs, the seller enjoys a surplus of P–Ps. Clearly, the seller will
choose PáPs. Otherwise, he gets negative surplus from selling the house, in which case he
is better off by not selling it.
Using the Leibnitz rule, the solution to equation (1), S* and P*, can be shown to
satisfy the following ﬁrst-order conditions;
l(1–P)(P–Ps)5gsC'(S), and (2)
BASE (3)
Equation (2) implies that the seller searches up to the point where his expected marginal
return from search is equal to his marginal cost of search. Equation (3) reﬂects the two
opposing effects of a change in P. The ﬁrst two terms in (3) reﬂect the fact that an
increase in P increases the seller’s gains in the case he sells the house, whereas the last
term in (3) reﬂects the fact that an increase in P decreases the seller’s gains by decreasing
the probability that the buyer will be willing to pay P for the house.
As mentioned earlier, the buyer chooses a search intensity, B, without knowing the S
and P choices of the seller. The buyer anticipates that the seller will choose S(Ps) and
P(Ps) if the seller’s valuation is Ps. However, not knowing Ps, the buyer must compute his
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BASE (4)
where S° is the buyer’s conjecture about the search intensity of the seller. Solving (4) for
optimum B, B*, yields the following ﬁrst-order condition:
BASE (5)
Equation (5) equates the buyer’s expected marginal return from search to his marginal
cost of search.
Search and Trading with a Broker
Next, we study the search and pricing strategies of the traders when the seller chooses to
list his house with a broker. Listing the house with a broker will increase the seller’s
probability of meeting the buyer. The new probability of a match between the buyer and
the seller is given by 0[u(S,B,M)5D(S1B+mM)[1, where 0[D[1⁄3, Me[0,1] is the
search intensity of the broker, and 0[m[1 is a measure of the degree of efﬁciency of the
broker’s search efforts. Note that the broker affects the efﬁciency of the buyer’s and
seller’s search efforts as well. This is reﬂected by the variable D: D$l if the broker’s and
the traders’ search efforts are complements (i.e., if the broker increases the contribution
of S and B on u for any given S and B), and D¢l if the broker’s and the traders’ search
efforts are substitutes (i.e., if the broker decreases the contribution of S and B on u for
any given S and B). Given that the seller meets the buyer, however, the probability that
the buyer’s reservation price will be higher than the seller’s ask price is the same with or
without a broker. In other words, as Salant (1991) points out, the broker speeds up the
matching process but does not bring in better prospects. The seller, in return, has to pay
k portion of the transaction price as a commission to the broker. It will be assumed that
the value of k is determined competitively in the brokerage market. The value of k, for
almost all the houses sold, is between 5% and 7%.
When the seller lists his house with a broker, his problem becomes:
BA (6)
where M°°e[0,1] and B°° are the seller’s conjecture about the search intensities of the
broker and the buyer, 0[m[1 is a measure of the degree of efﬁciency of the broker’s
search efforts, and kP is the commission fee that the seller has to pay to the broker in the
event that the house is sold.4 We assume an “exclusive-right-to-sell” listing contract
between the seller and the broker where seller has to pay the commission fee to the broker
when the house is sold even if the seller contacts the buyer on his own search efforts.
The solution to equation (6), S** and P**, will satisfy the following ﬁrst-order
conditions:
   
max ( , , ) ( ( ˜ ) ( ))( ) ˜ ( ),
, S P
s b s b s
P
W S B M S B P M P P P kP dP C S °° °° = + °° + °° - - - ò D m g
1




0 ò - - ¢ max{ , ( ˜ )} ˜ ( ). P P P dP C B b s s b
   
max ( , ) ( ( ˜ ))max{ , ( ˜ )} ˜ ( ),
B




586 THE JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH




The buyer’s problem in the presence of a broker becomes:
BASE
(9)
The buyer’s equilibrium search intensity, B**, is given by the solution to
BASE (10)
When the seller lists his house with the broker, he also informs the broker about his
price. Hence, the broker knows P (hence Ps) before she decides on a search intensity by
which she searches for the buyer. Given the competitive commission rate, k, the broker’s
problem becomes:
BASE (11)
where M is the broker’s search intensity, m is the parameter representing efﬁciency of the
broker’s search efforts, and gm is the parameter representing the broker’s search costs. The
broker’s equilibrium search intensity, M**, satisﬁes,
BASE (12)
It is interesting to note here that M**'5¶M**/¶P<0 when P>1⁄2 (i.e., when P>1⁄2, an
increase in the price of the house decreases the broker’s search intensity), while M**'>0
when P<1⁄2 (i.e., when P<1⁄2, an increase in the price of the house increases the broker’s
search intensity). An increase in P increases the broker’s commission from the sale of the
house (kP), but at the same time decreases the probability of selling the house (12P).
This result suggests that the former effect dominates the latter one when P<1⁄2, and the
latter effect dominates the former one when P>1⁄2. Note also that the broker’s search
intensity also depends positively on m, and negatively on gm.
A Comparison of the Prices
We will now use the above model to explain the seemingly conﬂicting empirical results in
the literature by showing that the broker might have a positive, negative, or zero impact
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COMPARISON OF REAL ESTATE MARKETING SYSTEMS 587on the housing prices, depending on the parameters of the model. We will provide an
example for each of these three cases.
Let search be costless for the traders (gs5gb50). This yields S5B51. Let also C(M)5
M 2. From (12), we get M**(P)5DmKp(12P)/2gm and M**'(P)5Dmk(122P)/2gm. In a
market with these characteristics, the price without a broker, P*, is given by (from
equation 3)
P*5(11Ps)/2 , (3a)
while the price under the broker, P** (from equation 8) will be given by the solution to
(12P**)[(12k)(21mM**)1mM**'(P**2Ps2kP**)]
2(21mM**)(P**2Ps2kP**)50 . (8a)
Example 1: P**>P* Let Ps51⁄2, k55%, m51, and gm small enough such that
M**51 øP** (hence, M**'50). Then, (3a) yields P*5.75, while (8a) yields P**5.763.
Example 2: P**5P* Let Ps50, k55%, m51, and gm small enough such that M**51
øP**. Then, the solution to (3a) and (8a) becomes P*5P**51⁄2.
Example 3: P**<P* Let Ps51⁄2, and Dmk/2gm54. Then, (3a) yields P*5.75, while
(8a) yields P**5.556.5
A comparison of Examples 1 and 2 illustrates that the valuation of the house by the
seller can be important in determining the impact of using a broker on the price. A
comparison of Examples 1 and 3, on the other hand, illustrates that the cost and efﬁciency
of broker’s search can also be a critical factor.
Of particular interest is the result of Example 3, in which the price of a house is lower
when it is sold through a broker than when it is sold by the seller himself. The intuition
here is that when the seller lists the house with a broker, he has to consider the impact of
his price choice on the broker’s search effort level. An increase in the seller’s price has two
opposing effects on the broker’s search intensity: one is that a higher price means a higher
commission fee in the event of a sale. Hence, it gives more incentives to the broker to
search harder. The other effect is that a higher price means a smaller probability that the
buyer will purchase the house. Hence, it reduces the broker’s incentives to search more.
The above result demonstrates that there exist markets where the second effect dominates
the ﬁrst one (equation 12 implies that this will happen whenever the price is bigger than
.5). This result also indicates that the seller reduces his price in order to procure a quicker
sale.
It should be noted that a broker does more than simply bring the buyer and the seller
together. Among other things, she also provides the parties information on mortgage
rates, tax advantages/disadvantages connected with the sale, and recent transaction prices
of similar houses. These additional services can cause the seller’s price to move either
direction, depending on how they affect the sellers’s search costs, and on how much the
buyer values these services. In order to keep the analysis tractable, however, we conﬁned
our attention here on the matching role of the brokers.
The dynamic search model of Salant (1991) provides another possible explanation for
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throughout time (due to a ﬁnite search horizon for the seller), with the exception that it
may jump up at the point when the seller decides to employ a broker. Assume that sellers
decide to search for buyers themselves until period t, and list their houses with a broker
if they cannot sell the house themselves before period t. This implies that the houses sold
directly by the sellers are sold before period t, while the houses sold through a broker are
sold after period t. Since the seller’s ask price is monotonically decreasing throughout
time (even though the price may jump up in period t), it becomes possible to observe
lower prices for the houses sold through brokers.
Although our model is a static model, it offers two contributions over Salant’s model.
First, it provides an additional insight for the possibility of observing lower prices under
brokerage: the seller may reduce the price to increase the broker’s search effort level in
order to procure a quicker sale. Thus, it demonstrates that Salant’s result holds even if we
assume away monotonically decreasing reservation prices due to a ﬁnite time horizon.
Second, the data in our model as well as in other empirical studies on this issue is a
“static” data.  It neither captures the seller’s asking/reservation prices throughout time
nor the jump/fall in the price when the seller quits trying to sell the property himself and
employs a broker.
The above model can also be applied to study price differences between houses sold
through MLS and non-MLS brokers. Under the MLS system, member brokers share
their listings and a member can sell the listing of another member and share the
brokerage commission. Therefore, the seller beneﬁts from the search efforts of the other
member brokers as well as the listing broker. As pointed out in Yavas ¸ (1994), in addition
to affecting the total search effort level expended on the seller’s house, the MLS can also
yield a more efﬁcient matching technology. These aspects of the MLS can be captured in
the above model by using a new matching technology and adding an additional variable
for the search efforts of the other MLS brokers (other than the listing broker) in
equations (6) through (8a). Therefore, the comparison of MLS sales to non-MLS sales is
similar to the comparison of brokered sales to FSBO sales. Thus, qualitatively similar
results can be obtained for the impact of MLS to those found in Examples 1–3 above. 
Empirical Evidence
This part of the paper provides empirical evidence for the impact of MLS services on
housing prices. We ﬁrst describe the data.
Data
The data for this study consists of 125 observations of residential real estate transactions.
Each of the observations include numerous observable variables of the transaction, as
well as observable characteristics of the residential property. Several data sources were
utilized. Information on all sales in the designated area under study was obtained for a
two-year period, January 1, 1977 to December 31, 1978, from the assessor’s ofﬁce. The
MLS “comp” books were used to identify which sales were MLS sales. The active non-
MLS brokers at the time of the study provided a list of properties sold by them. It is
assumed that all other sales were FSBOs. The property characteristics came from the
COMPARISON OF REAL ESTATE MARKETING SYSTEMS 589property appraisal cards in the Supervisor of Assessments’ ofﬁce or, in the case of MLS
sales, they came from the MLS “comp” books.
The area studied is a section in the southwest corner of Champaign, Illinois. The area
is bounded by Kirby Street and Windsor Road on the north and south, respectively, and
by Mattis Avenue and Duncan Road on the east and west, respectively. The legal
description is Section 22, T 19 N R 8 E, Champaign County, Illinois.
The mean lot size and living area of the properties were approximately 7,230 and 1,370
square feet, respectively. The homes on average had three bedrooms, one and a half baths,
and a one and a half car garage. Each home had an average age of approximately 10.5
years and had an average sales price of approximately $47,600. Furthermore, the data
sample can be divided into two subsamples. The ﬁrst subsample would include the home-
owners who sold their property with the aid of a multiple listing service (MLS), and the
second group would be those who did not use a multiple listing service (non-MLS). Of all
the transactions, 77.6% of the transactions involved a MLS and the remaining 22.4%
share were non-MLS transactions. Summary statistics of the two subsamples and the
entire sample are provided in the Appendix. An examination of the descriptive statistics
reveal that all three groupings have very similar attributes and that neither of the two
subsamples appear to differ signiﬁcantly from the entire sample.
We are interested in the price differential of residential real estate transactions that
exists due to the seller’s choice of whether to use a MLS or not. Since we are ultimately
interested in the price differential between MSL and non-MLS properties, it will be
necessary to estimate several regressions where the sales price of the transaction will be
the dependent variable. For this particular study, the variable LnP, the natural logarithm
of the sales price, will be used as a dependent variable. The explanatory variables that will
be included in the regressions will be observable property attributes. The variable
LnLVAR is the natural logarithm of the living area, where the natural log transformation
is used to allow for a nonlinear relationship. The variable BTH represents the number of
bathrooms in the house. BSMT is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if a
particular observation has a basement, and a value of 0 if no basement is present. The
variables CR and DETCR are closely related to one another. The variable CR represents
the size of the garage with respect to how many cars can ﬁt inside, while the variable
DETCR is the multiplicative transformation of the dummy variable DET and CR. The
indicator variable DET takes on a value of 1 if the garage is detached from the house, and
assumes a value of 0 if the garage is attached. Intuition would lead to the conclusion that
a larger garage is more desirable; however a detached garage is not as desirable as an
attached garage. This leads to the anticipation of the variable CR to have a positive
coefﬁcient, while the variable DETCR has a negative coefﬁcient. The variable AGE refers
to the age of the house and is expected to have a negative coefﬁcient. Finally, the variable
MOS refers to an indexed number of the month of sale where it has a value of 1 if the
property is sold in January 1977, 2 if it is sold in February 1977, and so on.
Methodology
Having examined the data set and explanatory variables, the methodology of this study
will now be discussed. Examination of the impact of MLS on sale price requires the use
of a two-stage estimation procedure due to possible sample selection bias. We are able to
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unable to observe what price that same house would have sold for if it were a non-
multiple listing service sale. This creates a problem when we want to examine the price
differential for an individual observation because this difference will not be able to be
observed. The two-stage estimation procedure that we use has been developed by Lee
(1978) and Lee and Trost (1978).6 We provide a brief description of the procedure below.
Since we are interested in the price differential between MLS and non-MLS
transactions, we start the analysis by separating the data into the two subsamples and






i is the natural logarithm of non-MLS house prices for observation i, xn
i is a
vector of explanatory variables for the non-MLS house sales, bn is the vector of
coefﬁcients for the correponding variables, and un
i is the normal error term for the ith
observation. Equation (14) contains the analogous explanatory variable vector, coefﬁcient
vector, and normal error term for the subsample of homes that were sold with the aid of
a MLS. From the estimated coefﬁcients, predicted values for the natural log of sales price
for MLS and non-MLS transactions can be calculated for all observations. The price
differential can then be simply calculated by taking the difference between the predicted
values. Alternatively, as has been done by previous studies (e.g., Doiron et al., 1985; Frew
and Jud, 1987; Tirtirog ˆlu, 1994; Jud, 1983; and Kamath and Yantek, 1982), one can use
dummy variable regressions where sale prices are regressed on several housing attributes
and a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 for those houses sold through a MLS
and 0 for others. However, these procedures are susceptible to sample selection bias. This
occurs because the MLS and non-MLS subsamples are mutually exclusive, hence the
MLS price and the non-MLS price cannot be observed simultaneously for any one
property. In other words, it could be that the MLS (non-MLS) subsample consists of
properties with attributes such that the price for that property was particularly favorable
using the MLS (non-MLS) system. As a result some sellers choose to use a MLS and
others do not and thus the dummy variable for MLS cannot be treated as exogenous.
Consequently, although the unconditional mean of the error terms in equations (13) and
(14) may be equal to zero, E(un
i)5E(um
i )50, their conditional expectations (conditional
on a MLS being used or not) may be greater or less than zero. To see this, consider the
seller’s choice of whether or not to use a MLS-broker. His choice can be represented
through the use of a probit equation with MLS as the limited dependent variable.
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where suun is the covariance between u and un, suum is the covariance between u and um, F
is the standard normal density function, and C is the cumulative normal density




Clearly, since the conditional expectations of the error terms may not be equal to zero,
this may introduce some bias into the vectors of coefﬁcient estimates bn and bm in (20)
and (21). If bias is introduced into the vectors of coefﬁcients, the predicted sales prices of
the non-MLS and MLS transactions will be biased, and that would ultimately lead to a
bias in the price differential. In order to solve this problem, we need to adjust the
conditional error terms in (20) and (21) so that they will have zero means. This can be
achieved by redeﬁning the error terms as:
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Now, we have E(Ôn
i?MLSi>0)5E(Ôm
i ?MLSi<0)50, and this provides us with consistent
estimates of the coefﬁcients in the hedonic equations. The terms F/C and F/(12C) are
the selectivity variables,8 and are treated as additional explanatory variables. In
computing the selectivity variables, we use the estimated values of Qi from the reduced-
form probit equation (17). It is important to note that the explanatory variables used in
each one of the hedonics do not have to be the same variables as those used in the probit,
but the union of the variables in the two subsamples must have the same variables as the
probit.
Results
The results of the hedonics for the non-MLS and MLS transactions can be found in the
ﬁrst Appendix table. We report the coefﬁcient estimates and the t-statistics with and
without including the selectivity variables (SELECT) variable. It is interesting to note
that in both of the hedonics that include the selectivity variables, SELECT, this variable
is not signiﬁcantly different from zero. This is important because the coefﬁcient on the
selection variable is a test of the existence of sample selection bias. Since the coefﬁcient is
not signiﬁcant, there is no sample selection bias present in either of the hedonics. This
suggests that the difference between the housing prices obtained in MLS and non-MLS
markets is not random and that there is a consistent pricing policy within each marketing
system.
In the absence of selectivity bias, the regressions are run once again excluding the
SELECT variables. The coefﬁcients estimated in the regressions that exclude the
SELECT variable are consistent and do not introduce bias into the prediction of the
natural log of sales price. Furthermore, when comparing the regressions with and
without the selection variables, one can observe that the R2 statistic essentially remains
constant, suggesting that the removal of the variable did not change the ﬁt to any great
degree. In addition, when comparing the two non-MLS and the two MLS hedonics, one
can see that the signs of the coefﬁcients remained the same even with the removal of the
selection variables, suggesting that the impact of the remaining variables is consistently in
the same direction.
Having established that sample selection bias was not present, the remainder of the
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COMPARISON OF REAL ESTATE MARKETING SYSTEMS 593analysis will concentrate on the non-MLS and MLS regressions that exclude the selection
variable. In both of the hedonics, all of the variables are signiﬁcant at the 10% level of
signiﬁcance with the exception of CR and DETCR in the non-MLS transactions.
Furthermore, using the 5% level of signiﬁcance, one can see that all of the variables
remain signiﬁcantly different from zero with the exception of BTH in the MLS
regression.
The variable LnLVAR, the natural log of living area, is signiﬁcant and positive in both
regressions, suggesting that more living area is a desirable characteristic that adds value
to a property. This result is intuitively appealing. The variable BTH, the number of
bathrooms, is consistently signiﬁcant at the 10% level and the coefﬁcient is positive. This
result was anticipated from the generalization that a greater number of bathrooms is
preferred to a lesser number. The variables AGE and MOS, the age of the property and
the indexed month of sale, behave in similar manners in both hedonics. Once again,
following intuition, the AGE variable has a negative coefﬁcient suggesting that a
property’s value decreases as it gets older. This is consistent with the ideas of simple wear
and tear and the various forms of depreciation that a property may experience as it ages.
Finally, the variable MOS had a positive impact on the estimation of the natural log of
sales price.
While many of the estimated coefﬁcients appeared to perform consistently in both the
non-MLS and MLS transactions, several variables did not. Included among these
variables are BSMT, CR and DETCR. First, the variable BSMT, the indicator variable
that tells of the existence of a basement in the house, is found to be signiﬁcantly different
from zero in both of the hedonics. Although the magnitudes of the estimated coefﬁcients
are similar, the signs of the parameters are different. For the non-MLS subsample the
presence of a basement appears to enhance the sales price, while the presence of a
basement detracts from sales price in the MLS subgroup. The negative coefﬁcient for the
BSMT variable in the MLS subgroup may seem peculiar, but it may not be peculiar in the
study area. The area was once a swamp. It has been tiled and drained for many years, but
the water table remains high. Thus, all but the most carefully damp-proofed, backﬁlled-
with-gravel, and tiled basements with sump pumps are wet from time to time. So this
result is not particularly surprising given prior knowledge of these local conditions.
Secondly, the behavior of the variables CR and DETCR appear to differ. As mentioned
earlier, the anticipation was that CR, the number of spaces in the garage, and DETCR,
the multiplicative variable that represents that size of the garage and whether or not the
garage is attached, would realize a positive and negative coefﬁcient, respectively. This
relationship was observed in both regressions; however, both variables were not
signiﬁcantly different from zero in the non-MLS hedonic. Observing these relationships,
it is obvious that CR and DETCR have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on sales price in MLS
transactions; however, their effect is essentially zero in non-MLS transactions.
Having discussed the impact of the independent variables, the next step of the
methodology is to estimate the “reduced-form” probit equation in (17) where the only
explanatory variable is the predicted price differential, LnPDIF (the difference between
the predicted natural log of sales price under MLS and the predicted natural log of sales
price under non-MLS for each property). This equation enables us to estimate the
direction of the effect of the expected price difference on the seller’s choice between MLS
and non-MLS systems. The results are reported in Appendix Table 2. Price difference has
a signiﬁcant impact on the choice of marketing strategy and, as expected, higher price
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VOLUME 10, NUMBER 5, 1995differential raises the probability that the seller chooses MLS. In other words, as the
expected price under MLS increases relative to the expected price under non-MLS, the
seller is more likely to use a MLS broker. Note that the estimated constant term is
signiﬁcant and has a value exceeding .5. This indicates that the seller is more likely to use
a MLS even when the expected price under MLS is the same as the expected price under
non-MLS. One potential reason is that MLS reduces the time it takes to sell the property.
Unfortunately, we have not been able to obtain the data on the duration each property
(especially FSBO sales) stayed in the market before it was sold.
Another indiction that there must be non-price factors affecting sellers’ choice of MLS
is that MLS generates a smaller price than non-MLS system in our sample. In comparing
the expected prices under the two systems we followed the approach taken by Lee (1978)
and used the following formula:
BASE (00)
where s ˆ m and s ˆ n are the standard errors of the estimated prices in MLS and non-MLS
sales and N is the total sample size. This formula measures the average percentage
increment of the price for the MLS sales compared with the non-MLS sales (see Lee,
1978: 426–27, for a derivation of the formula). The estimated average percentage
increment in our sample is 25.7%.9 Given the widespread use of MLS services, this result
indicates that there must be non-price beneﬁts to using a MLS. As we mentioned earlier,
one such potential beneﬁt is that MLS shortens the time it takes to sell a property. This
is also the intuition we provided for our theoretical result in section two that a seller
might choose to set a lower price under MLS in order to obtain a quicker sale. Another
possible reason for the negative price impact of MLS is that brokers have a tendency to
pressure the seller to reduce the asking price. The reason is that by getting a lower price
brokers give up a much smaller amount (the percentage of the price foregone as
commission revenue) than the sellers in return for a quicker sale. Furthermore, the
incentives for MLS brokers is bigger than non-MLS brokers because a MLS broker is
likely to share the commission with another MLS broker.
Conclusions
This paper has two parts. The ﬁrst part of the paper develops a bilateral search model
where a seller and a buyer search for each other to trade. The seller has two options. He
can either search for the buyer through his own efforts (FSBO), or list the house with a
broker and utilize the additional search efforts provided by the broker. If he chooses to
list the house with a broker, he has to pay a commission fee to the broker. In the event
that the seller chooses to use a broker, he considers the two opposing impacts of his price
choice on the broker’s search effort level: one is that a higher price means a higher
commission fee in the event of a sale. Hence, it gives more incentives to the broker to
search harder. The other effect is that a higher price means a smaller probability that a
buyer will purchase the house. Hence, it reduces the broker’s incentives to search more. It
is shown that, depending on the magnitudes of these two effects, the seller’s valuation of
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COMPARISON OF REAL ESTATE MARKETING SYSTEMS 595the house, and on the cost and efﬁciency of broker’s search, the price of a house sold by
FSBO can be lower, the same, or higher than the price of a similar house sold through a
broker. Using the same approach, it is argued that the price of a house sold through a
MLS broker can be lower, the same, or higher than the price of a similar house sold
through a non-MLS broker.
The second part of the paper provides empirical evidence of the impact of the MLS on
the housing prices. This impact was measured by the price differential that exists between
non-MLS and MLS transactions. In order to avoid possible sample selection bias, a two-
stage estimation procedure was utilized. The results of this procedure showed that sample
selection bias did not exist in this particular sample of non-MLS and MLS transactions.
Finally, it is found that expected price difference has a signiﬁcant impact on the choice of
marketing strategy and, as expected, higher price differential raises the likelihood of MLS
choice. When calculating the effect of the MLS decision on the price differential, it is
concluded that the decision to use a multiple listing service decreases the sale price of a
property.
Our results indicate that while expected price under alternative marketing strategies is
a signiﬁcant determinant of the marketing choice, it is not enough to explain the choice
of marketing strategy alone. In particular, it cannot explain the widespread use of MLS.
Therefore, the current study can also be interpreted as a call for future research to explore
other factors that affect the seller’s marketing strategy. Another interesting extension
would be to make a distinction between brokered sales and non-brokered sales and
compare the performance of MLS brokered sales with non-MLS brokered sales by
excluding FSBO from the non-MLS subsample. This comparison in our sample yielded
similar results to those reported in the current study (the results are available from the
authors upon request). However, we have not included the analysis of FSBO because of
the small size of the FSBO subsample in the study area. Also, the FSBO segment of the
market is smaller than surveys generally indicate (e.g., 7% versus 15% in a 1981 NAR®
survey). This latter problem casts some doubt on the representativeness of the FSBO
subsample.
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Appendix
The following is a summary of statistics of the variables utilized in this study.
Total Sample
(N = 125) Mean Std Dev. Min. Max.
MOS 12.0160 6.4608 1 23
LVAR 1367.1040 317.3414 912 2180
AGE 10.5040 17.6720 0 99
BTH 1.6200 .4769 1 2.5
BSMT .0640 .2457 0 1
CR 1.5280 .5052 0 2.5
DETCR .1680 .3754 0 1
MLS .7760 .4186 0 1
NONMLS .1520 .3605 0 1
FSBO .0720 .2595 0 1
PRICE 47605.96 11708.37 22500 70450COMPARISON OF REAL ESTATE MARKETING SYSTEMS 597
MLS Sample
(N = 97) Mean Std Dev. Min. Max.
MOS 12.1546 6.5469 1 23
LVAR 1369.8454 339.1109 912 2180
AGE 11.1959 19.7546 0 99
BTH 1.5722 .4787 1 2.5
BSMT .0206 .1428 0 1
CR 1.5670 .5236 0 2.5
DETCR .1649 .3731 0 1
MLS 1.0000 .0000 1 1
NONMLS .0000 .0000 0 0
FSBO .0000 .0000 0 0
PRICE 46966.96 12116.66 22500 70450
Non-MLS Sample
(N = 28) Mean Std Dev. Min. Max.
MOS 11.5357 6.2449 1 22
LVAR 1357.6071 231.3091 925 1861
AGE 8.1071 6.2500 2 21
BTH 1.7857 .4395 1 2.5
BSMT .2143 .4179 0 1
CR 1.3929 .4163 1 2
DETCR .1786 .3900 0 1
MLS .0000 .0000 0 0
NONMLS .6786 .4756 0 1
FSBO .3214 .4756 0 1
PRICE 49819.64 10051.25 25300 64500
Table 1
Subsample Const LnLVAR BTH BSMT CR DETCR AGE MOS SELECT R2 R –2
Non-MLS 3.571 .465 .062 .103 .074 2.048 2.013 .010 .054 .92 .88
(11.23) (1.84) (.29) (.44) (.46) (2.96) (21.95) (2.53) (.27)
MLS 3.331 .548 .094 2.188 .084 .044 2.003 .009 2.031 .87 .86
(54.11) (5.31) (1.00) (21.11) (1.40) (21.72) (24.48) (4.62) (2.20)
Non-MLS 3.496 .408 .116 .164 .033 2.037 2.015 .009 — .92 .89
(24.58) (3.16) (2.33) (3.85) (.78) (21.23) (23.20) (2.99) —
MLS 3.326 .561 .077 2.219 .095 2.048 2.003 .009 — .87 .86
(58.29) (7.03) (1.79) (22.96) (3.47) (22.47) (25.37) (25.21) —
Table 2
Dependent Variable Constant LnPDIF R2 R
– 2
MLS .77864 .47406 .06 .053
(21.359)* (2.8085)*
*Since lnPDIF is an estimated variable, these t-ratios may be misleading. As in Lee (1978) and
Brueckner and Follain (1988), we choose to ignore this problem rather than attempt to conduct the
complex process to correct it.Notes
1The intensity of search can be interpreted as the amount of advertising (size and frequency of ads,
number of newspapers in which they appear), amount of neighborhood search for houses for sale,
or the effort expended in spreading the word through friends and relatives, etc.
2This differs from the bargaining solution in Yavas ¸ (1992) where the price of the house is
determined through negotiations between the buyer and the seller after they meet each other. This
difference in modelling the determination of price is critical. While the impact of brokerage on the
price has been found to be always positive in Yavas ¸ (1992), it will be shown that the impact here
could be negative as well as positive.
3The choice of upper limit of one third has been made for the following reason: When we introduce
a search intensity for the broker in the next section, the sum of the search intensities by the buyer,
seller and the broker can take a maximum value of 3. Then, l[1⁄3 becomes a sufﬁcient condition
for u[1.
4It is possible that the price, P, is set by the seller and the broker together, or by the broker alone.
Since a higher P affects the seller and the broker in the same direction (higher surplus from a trade,
but lower probability of selling the house), it can be shown that the qualitative results of the paper
will be independent of who sets the price.
5Solving equation (8a) for P** involves very tedious algebra. Using a mathematical package
program, such as Mathematica, Maple or MathCad, will be useful.
Note that P*>Ps, P**>Ps, and P**2kP**>Ps in all three examples. One can also show that
there exists a set of parameters l and D such that the seller’s expected gain from listing the house
with a broker (even at a lower price as in Example 3) exceeds his expected gains from searching for
a buyer himself.
6Earlier applications of this procedure to real estate can be found in Brueckner and Follain (1988)
who study the mortgage choice problem between adjustable and ﬁxed-rate mortgages, and in
Munneke (1994) who examines the redevelopment decisions for commercial and industrial
properties.
7The choice of marketing system can also affect the time it takes to sell the property as well as the
price of the property. Due to lack of data, this issue has not been explored here.
8F/C is the inverse of Mill’s ratio, and in reliability theory it is known as the hazard rate.
9Given the absence of selectivity bias in our sample, we have also run a regression equation where
we have regressed the sale prices on the housing attributes in Appendix Table 1, and an MLS
dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 for those houses sold through a MLS and 0 for others.
The estimated coefﬁcient on the MLS dummy was negative and signiﬁcant at 10% level; MLS
reduces the price by 4.67%.
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